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Abstract
Although telos has been important in farm animal ethics for several decades, clearer 
understanding of it may be gained from the close reading of Aristotle’s primary texts 
on animals. Aristotle observed and classified animals informally in daily life and 
through planned evidence gathering and collection development. During this work 
he theorized his concept of telos, which includes species flourishing and a good 
life, and drew on extensive and detailed assessments of animal physiology, diet 
and behaviour. Aristotle believed that animals, like humans, have purpose, and that 
telos is natural and unchanging. Moreover, he greatly valued the economic, political 
and defence contributions of farmers to their communities. In his stockperson eth-
ics, animals are ordered to rational human purposes through husbandry, and good 
practice is established and shared by experience, habituation and training. Aristotle 
provides a useful and demanding framework for farm animal ethics that goes well 
beyond negative theories of welfare as freedom from harms.
Keywords Aristotle · Ethics · Farm animal · Stockperson · Telos
Aristotle’s concept of telos may be defined as the end or goal for which a being 
aims. It has a significant contribution to make to animal ethics and welfare. In sum-
mary, for an animal to have a telos means, for Aristotle, that there is a set of detailed 
behaviours and wider life goals that it naturally seeks to pursue. These are objective 
and specific to species (Hauskeller 2005). For example, poultry behaviours include 
dust bathing, foraging, nesting and nocturnal perching, while among the life goals 
of poultry are structured social living within a flock, and breeding. When an ani-
mal successfully pursues these ends, it enjoys the goods characteristic of its species 
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and flourishes, and may justly be said to have a good life. Although behaviours and 
goals form a continuum of ends, rather than comprising two separate categories, 
it is useful to distinguish them to show the variety of ends that compose telos and 
how subsidiary ends contribute to overarching ends. For example, the behaviours of 
nesting and perching help to create the conditions for breeding. This does not mean, 
however, that nesting and perching have value only in so far as they make breed-
ing possible. They are enjoyed for their own sake as well as making possible other 
activities.
The prominence of telos in current animal ethics is due in significant part to the 
philosopher and animal scientist Bernard E. Rollin, who traces his understanding of 
telos to Aristotle. From his earliest work almost four decades ago, Rollin has argued 
that, because animals have a telos, they deserve ethical consideration (Rollin 1981, 
38–40, 54–7, 160–4). However, farming practices sometimes frustrate the pursuit 
of telos, such as when a breeding sow confined within a gestation crate is unable 
to turn around or groom herself (Rollin 1995, 73–80). Although Aristotle viewed 
telos as fixed, genetic engineering now allows the possibility of ethically-respon-
sible modification of telos (Rollin 1998). Telos enables an understanding of animal 
motivations as more complex than simple pleasure seeking and pain avoidance, and 
may ultimately be a more important motivating factor than either of these (Rollin 
2012). Rollin has recently reiterated these themes in a synoptic study (2016, 47–55, 
97–129, 163–71).
Rollin’s project has been constructive, and his publications do not include much 
detailed reading of Aristotle. Moreover, when he cites ‘major discussions of telos in 
Aristotle’, Rollin (1998, 156) lists abstract and speculative works1 rather than those 
specifically on animals. These latter include the Generation of Animals (De gen-
eratione animalium), the History of Animals (Historia animalium), the Movement of 
Animals (De motu animalium), the Parts of Animals (De partibus animalium) and 
the Progression of Animals (De incessu animalium), which together comprise over 
one-sixth of Aristotle’s extant work.
Rollin identifies the principal influence on his own interpretation of Aristotle 
as John Herman Randall and his 1965–68 lectures at Columbia University (Rol-
lin 1998, 156). Randall interpreted telos as an end, but explicitly not as a pur-
pose, which he defined as a ‘consciously foreseen end’ that was, as such, limited 
to humans (1960, 124–9). Telos thereby expands the scope of moral consideration 
beyond humans, who are the only beings who engage in conscious deliberation 
(ibid., 186–8). Randall rightly viewed teleology as natural rather than as the result of 
divine design (ibid., 225–34). An animal’s telos is identified by observing its func-
tion within its wider ecosystem, rather than by appeal to a non-verifiable, God-given 
‘essence’.
In this article, my methodology will be to focus on the works listed above, in 
which Aristotle most directly and extensively discusses animals in general and 
farmed animals specifically. This will enable a richer practical understanding of his 
1 Physics, Metaphysics, On the Soul, On the Heavens and Posterior Analytics.
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animal ethics, including its sources and development, than a presentation focused on 
his speculative works, which will be referred to only if they aid interpretation.
Introduction: Aristotle and Animal Farming
A country boy, Aristotle was born in 384 BCE in the village of Stagira on the Chal-
cidice peninsula in northern Greece. Aged eighteen he moved to the metropolis of 
Athens to study at Plato’s Academy, where he remained for 20 years, before tutor-
ing the famed Macedonian conqueror King Alexander the Great. On completing 
this duty Aristotle stayed in Macedonia until the death of Alexander’s father, Philip 
of Macedon, in 335, either at his court or back home in Stagira. He then returned 
to Athens, founding a school under Alexander’s benefaction at the temple of the 
Lyceum, which included collections of fauna and flora, and an extensive library. Fol-
lowing Alexander’s death, the Macedonians fell out of favour in Athens. Fearing 
for his welfare and possibly his life, Aristotle retired to his mother’s family estate at 
Chalcis, where he died a year later in 322.
During his lifetime, Aristotle had three obvious opportunities to develop his 
understanding of farmed animals. First, it is highly likely that he observed and 
helped to care for farmed animals in childhood. Second, while he was tutoring Alex-
ander (347–40) and following this (340–35), before his return to Athens, Aristotle 
had ample time to undertake systematic empirical research into a wider range of 
species (Shields 2014, 18–23; Natali 2013, 41–2). Pliny the Elder (8.17; 1940, 34–5) 
suggests that his zoological research benefitted from Alexander’s active support, and 
a mandate to contact fishermen, fowlers, hunters, herders and other stockpersons2 
for any information he required. Third, when founding and developing his school 
at the Lyceum (335–23), Aristotle included animal collections, which reputedly 
extended to exotic species sent back by Alexander from his distant conquests. Some 
commentators (Lloyd 1979; Solmsen 1978) have regarded this as the most likely 
source of his animal knowledge, which locates it in the linked contexts of collabora-
tive research, collection building and book learning. Aristotle sometimes questions 
oral reports, but also queries written sources previously accepted as reliable.
The animals studied by Aristotle include native wildlife, exotic species and 
farmed animals. However, among those few commentators who have examined 
Aristotle’s work on animals, none has focused on farmed animals. In this article I 
shall demonstrate that his primary methodology was observation, both unstructured 
and systematic, and shall examine his understanding of the needs, behaviours and 
goods of species. I shall then show how he regards humans and animals as simi-
lar in ethically significant ways, including that they both have an internal governing 
principle (a ‘soul’) and a sense of purpose. Indeed, farmed animals will be seen to 
occupy a higher position in the natural order than wild animals because their lives 
2 Being a farmer entailed owning property, which was possible only for men. Stockpersons were not, 
however, all men. Excepting direct quotation, whenever referring to farming activity that did not entail 
property ownership by the person undertaking it I therefore employ gender-neutral language.
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are regulated by rational human principles. This order and regulation will be shown 
to inform an understanding of the idea of a ‘good life’ for animals. Finally, I shall 
explain the reasons for Aristotle’s high valuation of farmers and farming, and reflect 
on the role and education of the stockperson. This discussion will draw on his virtue 
ethics.
Observing and Theorizing
Fundamental to Aristotle’s methodology is the direct observation of the natural 
world. He laments that, during the time of Socrates and, by implication, of Plato, 
‘research into the natural world ceased, and philosophers turned instead to practi-
cal virtue and politics’ (Parts 1.1, 642a29-313). Although he was, of course, him-
self greatly interested in politics and virtue, Aristotle wished to correct what was, 
in his time, a novel neglect of the natural world by setting these within their proper 
context. In the words of his translators, Aristotle’s was the ‘first attempt in Europe 
to observe and describe in a scientific way the individual living object’ (Aristotle 
1961, 11). Aristotle could therefore be regarded as anticipating modern evidence-
based ethics, adopting a practical approach not just to human virtue and politics, 
for which he is well known, but to the non-human world too. However, he does not 
regard observation as simple data gathering. Rather, observation permits an observer 
to construct theories about nature and its operations by means of concepts such as 
perception, reason, cause, habit, generation and relation. For Aristotle, there is no 
contradiction between observation and philosophical theorizing. This is because the 
role of philosophy is to understand and interpret the world as humans observe it. 
Philosophers must therefore either themselves employ observation or engage with 
the observations of others. Aristotle states that ‘first one should get hold of the phe-
nomena concerning each kind, then state their causes’ (Parts 1.1, 640a14). This 
methodology enables him to address species characteristics and welfare, especially 
regarding animal diet.
Aristotle possesses a detailed understanding of rumination, derived from both 
written texts and dissection (Gotthelf 1987, 178–85). Cattle, he observes, consume 
grain and herbage.4 They fatten on bitter vetch, bruised beans, bean stalks, barley, 
figs, raisins, wine and elm leaves (Hist. 7.7, 595b6-13). The best means of fattening, 
however, are heat from the sun and wallowing in warm water. Aristotle’s observa-
tions for sheep and goats are similar. These, he notes, feed on herbage and are fat-
tened by olive twigs, vetch and bran (Hist. 7.10, 596a14-30; 6.19, 574a9-11). How-
ever, he explains that the best way to fatten sheep is to get them to drink. For this 
reason, he says, during summer flocks are fed salt every 5 days. Salt is also added to 
their bran and sprinkled onto the cucumbers that they are fed in autumn. As well as 
3 The standard format of citing Aristotle refers to the 1831 Bekker edition, which is reproduced in mod-
ern parallel editions and translations.
4 This term encompasses grass and other herbaceous plants on which herds and flocks may graze.
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causing the sheep to drink more, salt improves their health, expands their udders at 
the start of lambing and increases milk yield.
The wide variety of foods recommended for feeding and finishing is striking. For 
pigs, the advantages of a varied intake are clearly stated. Aristotle notes their excep-
tional diet, especially their avoidance of grass and fruit, and their love of roots (Hist. 
7.6, 595a15-b1). The pig, he continues, is the ‘animal that takes most easily to food’, 
fattening in as little as 60 days, which is quicker than any other animal. The foods on 
which it fattens are barley, millet, figs, acorns, wild pears, cucumbers and chickpeas, 
with a varied diet likely to produce optimal results (also Hist. 7.21, 603b25-27). Pig 
fattening is also promoted by wallowing in mud.
Aristotle presents a small-scale agricultural economy in which products and 
by-products that humans would not normally choose to consume, such as bruised 
beans, bean stalks and wine-press residue, are important in animal diets, along 
with inferior grains such as barley. For fattening, the non-dietary measures that he 
prescribes draw on the natural resources and possibilities that are easily and freely 
available: sunlight, warmth, water and sleep. These dietary and other prescriptions 
are grounded in the belief, previously discussed, that everything in nature is ordered 
to its end, thereby contributing to the functioning of the whole. This belief predis-
poses Aristotle to identify solutions within nature rather than, for instance, to invent 
new feeds or finishing technologies. His holistic and harmonious view of the natu-
ral world, and of the place of farmed animals within it, suggests a symbiotic rela-
tionship between humans and farmed animals, with farmers making use of what is 
naturally available. For example, Aristotle reports that ewe’s milk is important for 
cheesemaking because ewes may be milked for 8 months a year (Hist. 3.21, 523a5-
7). Although modern dairy ewes may lactate for 9 or 10 months, his point clearly 
addresses what is naturally available at the time.
At least three of Aristotle’s examples suggest that the results of these natural 
regimens matched and even exceeded modern expectations. The large dairy cows 
of Epeirus—a region now straddling Greece and Albania—are reported to produce 
a daily yield of up to nine gallons (72 pints), with the milker needing to adopt a 
crouched standing position because the teats are too high to reach when seated (Hist. 
3.21, 522b16-19). This yield, high even by modern standards, is attributed to the 
abundant pasture suited to the different seasons, particularly vetch and (non-flower-
ing) cytisus (ibid., 522b26-8). Milk expression was induced by feeding with beans 
and other plants that cause flatulence. A second example of high-level production is 
pig litter size, which Aristotle states can be as high as twenty, along with the strik-
ingly modern observation that ‘if the litter is very large they cannot rear them all’ 
(Hist. 6.18, 573a32-34). Later in the same work, he observes the frequency with 
which domesticated hens lay: up to twice daily (Hist. 6.1, 558b20). Even by modern 
standards this is high frequency. Incubation was no doubt aided by a warm climate, 
with the heat from the air or the ground sometimes sufficient to trigger incubation 
(Gen. 3.2, 752b29-35, 753a17-20).
A final species that Aristotle discusses is the partridge. His treatment of the 
bird is noteworthy because of his moralization of its behaviour. The partridge, he 
asserts, has a ‘bad character’ and performs ‘wicked tricks’ (Hist. 8.8, 613b23-4). 
Aristotle describes male partridges smashing any eggs that they find, attributing this 
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behaviour to their lecherous nature. His implication is that the smashing of eggs pro-
vides the males with justification for another round of mating, so that new eggs may 
be fertilized. In consequence, the hen lays her eggs in obscure locations and avoids 
visiting them (Hist. 8.8, 613b25-14a31).
In this section it has been shown that observation provides the foundations for 
Aristotle’s ethical understanding of animals. What is morally right is what harmo-
nizes with the provisions and rhythms of nature. Farmed animals and farmers live 
in a symbiotic relationship with each other, with small animal groups cared for by 
individual farmers who know their needs and behaviours.
Animals Souls and Purposes
From a biological standpoint, Aristotle does not regard humans as straightforwardly 
superior to other animals, recognizing the whole animal kingdom as worthy of 
examination. Marvels and beauty are identifiable in every natural realm. Aristotle 
notes, for instance, that among farmed animals, pigs are unrivalled in producing 
‘numerous offspring that are perfectly formed’ (Gen. 4.6, 774b16-17). He is alive to 
the sophistication of many species. Indeed, the most noteworthy features of sentient 
life are unlikely to be found in the human species. Aristotle avers: ‘it is impossible to 
look at that from which humankind has been constituted—blood, flesh, bones, blood 
vessels, and other such parts—without considerable disgust’ (Parts 1.5, 645a27-30). 
He nevertheless deigns to examine human biology alongside that of the animal king-
dom. In a survey of generative capacity he discusses the human between the cow 
and the ass (Hist. 5.14, 545b27-30).
Linked with the close kinship that Aristotle perceives between humans and other 
animals is his view that both humans and animals have souls. His conception of 
the soul differs from Plato’s. For Aristotle, the soul is not a distinct spiritual entity 
that may contemplate a higher realm of transcendent truth or be abstracted from the 
body so as ascend and enter such a realm. Rather, the soul is the animating form 
of a living being (Parts 1.1, 641a18), or its internal governing principle. When an 
animal dies, its soul may be said to depart from its body, because none of the parts 
of what previously composed the animal remain in living form. For Aristotle, the 
soul provides an animal’s living, coordinating, moving and generating principle, and 
is therefore an appropriate object of scientific investigation. He strikingly asserts: 
‘It will be up to the natural philosopher [i.e. scientist] to speak and know about the 
soul; and if not all of it, about that very part in virtue of which the animal is such as 
it is.’ (Parts 1.1, 641a21-22) An animal’s soul, Aristotle continues, constitutes its 
nature as final cause, guiding the animal to the ends that it seeks in its life. For this 
reason, the soul is a more significant indicator of an animal’s nature than the matter 
composing its body: the soul enables matter to constitute the animal nature, rather 
than matter enabling the soul (Lear and Jonathan 1988, 45–9). In another text, Aris-
totle pictures an animal’s soul as governing the harmonious operation of its different 
bodily parts. Comparing the animal organism with a well-governed commonwealth, 
he writes that the soul is ‘situated in a central origin of authority over the body’, 
with the other parts each living by ‘structural attachment’ to it and performing their 
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own functions (Mov. 703a36-b2). In his understanding of the soul, Aristotle there-
fore perceives considerable similarity between animals and humans.
The same is true of his understanding of human and animal actions. Intentional 
human acts are governed by ends: for example, I might decide to walk to the shop 
to buy a piece of cheese. However, Aristotle strikingly suggests that, in animals, 
the link between intention and action is more evident than in humans. He thus 
understands animal actions as surprisingly similar to human actions, contradicting 
Randall (1960, 124–9), who opposes the idea that animals act purposively. Aristo-
tle recognizes that animals ‘neither enquire nor deliberate’ (Phys. 2.8, 199a20-22). 
They do not reflectively investigate nor consider different options before acting, even 
though they might evince simple learned avoidance behaviours. Rather, animals act 
without mediating rational processes, which can obscure both intention and action. 
Animals are moved not by thought but rather by desire, which may include elements 
of intellect (dianoia), imagination, purpose (proairesis), wish and appetite (Mov. 6, 
700b17-19). In humans, the stated reason for doing something can itself become the 
intention, and the action is then likely to become delimited by the possibilities that 
reason constructs. When eating, for example, my choices might be overdetermined 
by the tenets of a fashionable diet to the extent that I am unwilling to consume any-
thing incompatible with it. In contrast, when animals act, Aristotle argues, they act 
‘by nature and also for a purpose’ (Phys. 2.8, 199a26). He robustly defends this view 
of nature as purposive. Directly refuting his critics, Aristotle contends: ‘When the 
desirable result is effected invariably or normally, it is not an incidental or chance 
occurrence…. It is absurd to suppose that there is no purpose [heneka] because in 
nature we can never detect the moving power in the act of deliberation.’ (Phys. 2.8, 
199b24-27) So whereas animal telos is intensely purposive, human telos is delib-
erative. This indicates a qualitative different between human teloi and animal teloi, 
although, as has been just been shown, the corollary of the qualitative gain that rea-
son brings to humans is a quantitative loss in purposiveness.
Aristotle’s notion that all animals exist for the sake of humans suggests that 
farmed animals fulfil their telos more fully than wild animals. A wild animal may 
be hunted by humans and be captured or killed, but a farmed animal has its whole 
life humanly ordered, from birth to death. Just as the soul governs the body and rea-
son governs passion, so animals, Aristotle argues, should be governed by humans. 
He writes that ‘tame animals are superior in their nature to wild animals’ (Pol. 1.2, 
1254b10-13). Aristotle does not advocate the despotic rule of humans over animals. 
Rather, he sees farming as in the best interests of the animals being farmed or oth-
erwise tamed by humans. Aristotle thus lends strong support to the notion that ani-
mal farming is a legitimate and even desirable human activity. Indeed, his reasoning 
would appear to endorse the maximum level of animal farming compatible with the 
promotion of natural behaviours and teloi according to rational principles.
An implication of Aristotle’s harmonious vision of human–animal relations is the 
convergence of ‘natural’ behaviours, which an animal might exhibit when unfarmed, 
with ‘normal’ behaviours, into which farming systems might habituate it. Aristotle 
calls into question the notion that animals could or should live free from humans, 
indicating that this would not be in their best interests. He thus construes the ‘nor-
mal’ as part of the ‘natural’. Yet the normal is not coextensive with the natural. For 
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Aristotle, farming systems are functional only if they promote natural animal behav-
iours, and this principle significantly delimits the range of acceptable systems.
Aristotle’s theory of telos theoretically justifies the belief that animals exist for the 
sake of humans, and that plants exist for the sake of animals (Connell 2015, 240–5; 
Johnson 2005, 229–37; Kullmann 1979, 8–9). Nature, he believes, acts ‘for the sake 
of’ something, even though natural ends, unlike human ends, are not pursued as the 
result of deliberation or intention (Johnson 2005, 204–10). Natural processes are not 
produced by mere chance or spontaneity: teeth, for example, grow predictably, while 
rain and heat are seasonal (Phys. 2.8, 198b17-199a8). Aristotle does not here claim 
complete regularity or predictability, recognizing exceptions and a degree of uncer-
tainty. Nevertheless, the notions of exception and uncertainty themselves assume 
a background norm of non-random events. Organic growth, Aristotle states, is for 
the sake of an end, which also governs the nature of a thing. For instance, a chick 
embryo in an egg (Gen. 3.1-2, 749a10-754a20) will, over time, grow into a chicken 
that is able to enjoy freedoms and express preferences for food, habitat and com-
pany. Another example of organic growth is the snout of a pig, which is ‘naturally 
well constituted’ to dig up the roots that a pig likes to eat (Hist. 7.6, 595a17-18).
Because Aristotle views animal natures and goods as fixed, his framework is 
inhospitable to genetic modification. Some commentators, including Rollin (2014), 
have suggested that this is not necessarily the case, and that teloi may be altered 
to reduce suffering and make animals better fitted to their environment. This is a 
clear development of Aristotle’s own view, which did not allow for changeable or 
improvable natures, and so at the least suggests that genetic modification should be 
approached with caution. In any case, in the present article this debate is simply 
noted as it cannot be addressed in detail.
In current animal welfare discourse, when an animal’s needs, wants and desires 
are met to a high degree, it may be said to enjoy a good life. Aristotle himself 
defines the good of a thing as that at which it aims (Nic. eth. 1.1, 1094a1-3). This 
aim, and its associated good, is a result of function, which in the case of cattle and 
other farmed species is, in its most general terms, sentient life (Nic. eth. 1.7, 1098a2-
4). This life is governed by the soul’s nutritive, or vegetative, faculty, through which 
an animal’s body is nourished and grows and which thereby contributes to the excel-
lence with which it fulfils its function (Nic. eth. 1.13, 1102a34-b12). Aristotle states 
that to say that a living being has enjoyed a good life requires a perspective extend-
ing across its whole lifespan (Nic. eth. 1.7, 1098a18-19). From this it follows that 
only at the end of its life, whether this is a result of slaughter or humane killing, may 
an animal be said to have lived a good life. Aristotle develops a rich understanding 
of goodness, including animal purpose and the value added by husbandry, that has 
the potential to inform the concept of a good life currently used in animal welfare.
Farmers and Stockpersons
Although Aristotle presents animals as possessing souls, it has been seen that he 
understands the soul as simply an internal governing principle. Humans, in con-
trast, because they possess deliberative rationality, establish complex communities 
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grounded in family, social, economic and political relationships. Within such com-
munities, Aristotle recognizes farming to be one of life’s primary occupations, sup-
plying a household’s basic needs. Farming is grounded in property, that is, in the 
land, animals and equipment required to meet the needs of a household and of the 
urban populations that also depend on rural agriculture. Aristotle (or one of his stu-
dents) views the household as the primary constituent of a political community, 
requiring the economic foundation just described for its survival. Importantly, the 
establishment of the household precedes any form of political association (Ec. 1.1, 
1343a10-14). It is out of households, sustained by farming, that a society is com-
posed, whereas politicians cannot themselves meet the basic human needs that farm-
ing satisfies. Indeed, politicians do not produce anything. Comparing farming with 
commerce, with war, and with mining and other forms of extraction, Aristotle con-
tends that farming surpasses them all. He enthuses:
Agriculture is the most honest of all such occupations; seeing that the wealth 
it brings is not derived from others. Herein it is distinguished from trade and 
the wage-earning employments, which acquire wealth from others by their 
consent; and from war, which wrings it from them perforce. It is also a natu-
ral occupation; since by nature’s appointment all creatures receive sustenance 
from their mother, and humankind like the rest from their common mother of 
the earth.
And besides all this, agriculture contributes notably to the making of courage 
(andreia); because, unlike the mechanical arts, it does not cripple and weaken 
the bodies of those engaged in it, but inures them to exposure and toil and 
invigorates them to face the perils of war. For the farmer’s possessions, unlike 
those of other men, lie outside the city’s defences. (Ec. 1343a25-b6)
Farming, Aristotle believes, is a fair and honest living. The farmer gives to his fel-
low citizens rather than taking from them, meeting real needs. Agricultural products 
bring people together into sustainable communities with deep bonds of attachment. 
This is illustrated by Aristotle’s use of the striking term homogalaktes, which means 
‘sharers of the same milk’, to describe people living together in a settled small-scale 
community (Derks 1995).
The farmer whom Aristotle holds up for praise is neither the subsistence farmer, 
nor the absentee landowner, but the mid-level householder-farmer (Hanson 1999, 
111–17; Thompson 2018, 58). By his ongoing productive work and land manage-
ment, such a person promotes the stability of the rural community (Hanson 1999, 
188–93). This perspective provides an important corrective to the standard view of 
Aristotle as idealizing the urban political community. In fact, what he terms a polis 
may be either a built-up city or a connected rural community. Moreover, a rural polis 
may well be more stable than an urban polis, where politics is more likely to be pur-
sued for its own sake by a salaried class of professional politicians than by citizens 
alongside their day-to-day work.
In view of his rural upbringing, Aristotle’s high respect for farming is unsur-
prising. His association of farming with bravery is maybe less expected. This is 
not because the connection is false: farming sometimes requires bravery in deal-
ing with unpredictable or potentially hazardous physical situations. Nevertheless, 
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bravery is not a principal character trait for farmers. The bravery that farmers 
might acquire is, however, significant for Aristotle because of the political con-
text in which he writes. City states, both urban and rural, were in ongoing com-
petition for military alliances and advantage, and citizens might be called upon to 
fight in a military campaign for their state’s continued independence. The martial 
virtues were thus fundamental to maintaining a strong and stable state. Indeed, 
when enumerating the virtues Aristotle lists courage first (Nic. eth. 2.7, 3.6-9, 
1107a32-b1, 1115a3-1117b23). Without courage the state would not exist, nor 
therefore would any opportunity to practice other virtues.
There is a second reason to associate farming with bravery. Aristotle’s teacher 
Plato had already recognized that farming might require the military conquest 
of a neighbour’s land to provide sufficient pasture and ploughland to sustain a 
large and well-fed city, especially if the citizens wished to consume large quanti-
ties of beef (Republic 9.9, 373b2-e3). Aristotle further explores this association 
of war with meat-eating by linking the latter with arable farming. He notes that, 
after animals are born, they exist for the sake of humans, but that plants exist 
for the sake of the animals. The acquisition of land on which to grow the crops 
that farmed animals will eat is therefore a natural part of household management, 
whether practiced on a small scale by individual farmers or on a much larger 
scale by statesmen (Pol. 1.3, 1256b15-39).
A stockperson’s primary role is to promote the good of the animals in their 
care, ensuring that their needs, wants and desires are satisfied. The stockperson 
possesses accumulated practical wisdom about how to care for farmed species. 
Aristotle reminds us of the premodern intimacy between the stockperson and 
their flock. For example, he advises that, to keep warm, the shepherd should sleep 
among the goats rather than among the sheep. This is because goats are less toler-
ant of cold than sheep (Hist. 8.3, 610b32-4).
Drawing on past observation, the stockperson recognizes their animals’ natural 
behaviours and works with these in ways that are sometimes counterintuitive. In 
winter, Aristotle recounts, shepherds can identify the strong ewes. The weakly, 
he explains, shake the frost off their bodies, whereas the strong are unperturbed 
by the frost and allow it to remain (Hist. 7.10, 596a31-b2). This suggests that 
the shepherd, rather than brushing the frost off the sheep on which it remains, 
should attend to the sheep that are frost-free. In a snowstorm, a ewe may remain 
still even to the point of perishing, unless moved on by the shepherd (Hist. 8.3, 
610b25-29). However, the shepherd trains a flock to close in by clapping their 
hands, imitating a storm (ibid., 610b34-11a1). Also, Aristotle says that the shep-
herds always ‘train one of the rams to be bell-wether’ (Hist. 6.19, 573b25-27). 
This ram, probably wearing a bell around its neck, is taught from an early age to 
lead the flock. When tending cattle at pasture, the stockperson knows that a single 
animal must not be permitted to stray, because if they do so the rest will follow 
(Hist. 8.4, 611a7-9). The stockperson’s knowledge frequently extends to veteri-
nary-type skills in the diagnosis and treatment of illness. Aristotle recognizes that 
pigs are highly prone to disease, attributing to pig-keepers the knowledge of how 
to cure branchos (swine fever), identifiable by the symptoms of swelling around 
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the windpipe and jaws (Hist. 7.21, 603a1-b7, 603b29-30). Other farm animal dis-
eases and possible cures are discussed at length (Hist. 7.21-5, 603b8-605a22).
This consideration of stockperson ethics draws us into wider human ethics. The 
stockperson, like all human agents, develops his or her capabilities by cultivating 
virtues. Some of these are moral whereas others are intellectual. As previously 
described, the moral virtue with which Aristotle primarily associates farming is 
courage (andreia). This is especially true for the shepherd protecting a flock in an 
isolated location beset with predators or thieves. The stockperson will also require a 
measured attitude to pain, exercising self-control (sophrosune) when caring for ani-
mals and treating them, and taking full account of their pain and pleasure (Nic. eth. 
3.10, 1117b24-1118b8). The stockperson, or their employing farmer, will require 
an appropriate willingness to spend money (eleutheriotes, Nic. eth. 4.1, 1119b22-
1122a17) in order that animals’ welfare needs are met.
Aristotle discusses at length how these and other moral virtues are acquired 
through training and habituation. The stockperson will require practice in exercis-
ing and developing these virtues. They will need opportunities for self-observation 
and self-reflection so that they may correct, over time, the excesses or deficiencies in 
their acquisition and exercise of specific virtues. For example, a stockperson might 
either be insufficiently sensible to animal suffering, or so concerned with it that a 
flock ceases to be productive. In either case, by consciously resisting the vice to 
which they are more prone, the stockperson is likely gradually to develop a virtuous 
character from which appropriate attitudes to animals and behaviours towards them 
will follow.
Conclusion: A Good Life for Farmed Animals
Aristotle’s general theory of telos, as outlined in his philosophical writings, may 
be applied to animals and thus used to support animal ethics. However, this exami-
nation of the texts in which he discusses animals directly shows that, rather than 
being first a theory that may subsequently be applied to practice, the idea of telos is 
developed via the practical observation of animals and specifically farmed animals, 
and only then becomes a theory. Aristotle provides a useful framework for under-
standing the ends and flourishing of farmed animals, which he developed and tested 
through early informal observation of animals and stockpersons, and later in a con-
text of collaborative research funded by patrons. Recognizing farmed animals to be 
purposeful beings, his framework goes well beyond negative theories of welfare as 
freedom from harms. Aristotle also shows that stockpersons have a key role in iden-
tifying and promoting positive welfare states.
Aristotle regards goods as objective rather than as just whatever an animal seeks 
at a specified moment. Animal perceptions of the good may, like human perceptions, 
become distorted by habituated abnormal behaviours. Farmers and other stockper-
sons may be able to correct this by drawing on their own and others’ experience. 
For this reason, it is useful that Aristotle focuses on ‘natural’ behaviour. Because 
he views humans as part of nature, and focuses on small-scale production, Aristotle 
does not himself see much difference between ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ behaviours. 
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However, in the present day, unnatural behaviours may become normalized in sub-
optimal production systems, and Aristotle’s theory of telos calls this into question.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
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